


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SOME FRONTIERS OF TO-MORROW

AN ASPIRATION FOR EUROPE

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P R E F A C E

THIS little book is based on a lecture delivered to the Royal Geographical Society. During the discussion that followed the lecture two speakers suggested that reference to such a subject was premature. I could not admit that contention even then (December 1914); and the audience evidently not only agreed with me, but also accepted my reason. Previous discussion is an absolutely essential preliminary to offering presently any suggestions for a practical settlement. Nor can we make any rational provision for the immediate future without full consideration of the recent past.

I am anxious, however, that this little contribution to such discussion should not seem to be presumptuous, especially in its implicit assumption that the Central Empires will be defeated. I will only say that to

very many of us live under its present burdens would be almost intolerable if it were not for our absolute conviction that victory will never sanction a ruthless repudiation of solemn International obligations and a deliberate adoption of scientific savagery. At the same time I am convinced that Europe will—sooner or later—be settled on some such lines as are here suggested.

I am much indebted to my friends, Mr. J. J. Robinson and the Warden of Wadham College, Oxford, for their kind help in reading the proofs and making invaluable suggestions.

I propose to devote any profits on the book to the Wounded Allies' Relief Committee, Sardinia House, Kingsway, W.C.

L. W. L.

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On these maps present frontiers are marked by dashes — — — —, and proposed changes by dots ; and when there are no dots, the present frontiers are accepted.

SOME FRONTIERS OF TO-MORROW

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

As suggested in the Preface, this little book is an attempt to provoke and, if possible, to assist further discussion about desirable political frontiers in Europe; and it even ventures to suggest definitely what they should be. The articles of belief on which it is based, are three :—

- (1) That political frontiers should be national;
- (2) That where they cannot be national, they should be assimilative;
- (3) That everywhere they should be, as far as possible, anti-defensive.

By 'national' one means that the frontiers

should definitely represent the sentiment and consciousness of the people within them. It may be difficult to determine the essential basis in some cases ; reckless appeals to plebiscites in the backward areas, where the difficulty will be greatest, will almost certainly be failures ; in these areas, too, the dynastic leanings of German princes are emphasised by the political events of recent years in Britain and France. But nationality is the only basis for a long, if not permanent, peace.

By ‘assimilative’ one means that no Power which has proved itself incapable of assimilating alien types, should be allowed to annex fresh land ; and any such Power should be compelled to disgorge any unassimilated populations where there is unquestionable evidence of their having been grossly ill-treated.

By ‘anti-defensive’ one means that all frontiers, as far as possible, should be identified with geographical features which are associated naturally with the meeting of peoples and persons in the ordinary routine of *peaceful* intercourse. This involves a

matter of fact which is beyond dispute—namely, that the most obvious and most universal of such features is a navigable river.

On the contrary, although a common language and a common literature, like a common creed, obviously have a real cementing power and value, there is no justification for making language a test of nationality. But the magnificent unity of Belgium in spite of a language line running right across the country from east to west—along the latitude of Waterloo—makes it unnecessary to elaborate the point.

At the same time, there would seem to be some significance in the spread of a language across a hostile frontier where economic intercourse is at a minimum, where the physical obstacle is very considerable, and where the official political opposition is at a maximum. This is the case where French has spread eastward across the crest of the Vosges, and is spoken in many places by even 20 per cent., and in some places by over 30 per cent., of the population.

Nor is there any justification for making

‘race,’ in the narrow sense, a final test of nationality. Again, Belgium, with its tall, fair, long-headed Flemings on the northern lowland, and its short, dark, round-headed Walloons on the southern upland, gives a conclusive answer ; and the evidence is only strengthened, not weakened, by the probability that *if* the Flemings became Protestant, they would unite politically with the Dutch.

The only test acceptable is that of national sentiment in the holding of common ideals. These may be based partly on a whole world of associations from an historic past of things achieved,—probably also on political and economic principles epitomised in a present national type,—possibly even on a passionate aspiration for a clearly pictured future in which that type shall have reached a certain standard of perfection.

Of all the diverse considerations, religion—even in most parts of the Balkan Peninsula, where the *odium theologicum* is more poisonous than elsewhere—is steadily becoming less important, and identity of economic interest is steadily becoming the

most important. But it must be admitted that the whole civilised world is the happier and the stronger because little Belgium did *not* adopt the attitude illuminated by the quaint persiflage of a leading London 'Daily' in its urgent demand for neutrality on the ground that by keeping neutral now we should be able to sell enormous quantities of war material to all the belligerents!—as though war material was, *e.g.*, cocoa.

One thing must be faced ; and, to a life-long opponent of 'militarism,'—in its true meaning,—it humiliates one. It is that the very rapid consolidation of nationality as the expression of true democracy, especially in south-eastern Europe, has been due to compulsory military service ; and we must, however reluctantly, face both the fact that its influence has been democratic, not dynastic, and the character of that influence as it appears to skilled observers on the spot.

As they see it, everywhere the mere fact of doing his duty *to* the State seems to have bred in the conscript a consciousness that he has honourable claims *on* the State ;

no longer does the State itself risk breeding its next generation of citizens from fathers with a minimum of grit and gallantry ; and, legal pressure being applied to enforce the hardest of all duties to the State, moral pressure can concentrate all its higher influence on the still harder duties of man to man.

If the phenomena have been observed with anything approaching accuracy, these little States are undergoing a veritable resurrection ; and two things seem certain. The various units are ripe for the complete working out of their own internal salvation—if only they can keep themselves free from those two deadliest foes of democracy, your politician and his caucus ; and, just because of that, they will extort full recognition and consideration from external Powers.

CHAPTER II

NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL FRONTIERS

THE frontier, in its earliest unconscious conception, seems to have been the extreme limit of the area from which the people living within it could obtain the necessary supplies of food. In what may be called its ideal illustration, on the steppe, survival of the little semi-political unit depended on an adequate minimum of area. If too small, it prevented the development of anything more than a purely family group ; if too large, it tended towards incoherence—such as has been the curse of much of the African savanna, because it gave such opportunities for European intrigue and encroachment.

But security was as essential as size to this survival, and prescriptive rights of

pasture were apt to be pushed up to some conspicuous natural features as lines of trespass. The most conspicuous features available as such frontiers, were mountains and rivers; and the latter were in several ways the more effective. For instance, what we call the 'primitive' river-frontier, has been particularly useful in half-explored areas, because it was practically indisputable, it needed no mathematical plotting, and it had certain military merits, *e.g.* of delaying an enemy and concentrating his energies on such points as fords and bridges. 'Navigable' rivers were just as great a hindrance to the primitive man, especially if purely a landsman, as they are now a help to the civilised man; and the fact that they did encourage some movement *parallel* with their course, has been invested with a much exaggerated importance.

But a river frontier approximated to the nature of a line, while deserts, seas, and swamps were in the nature of a belt; and the latter made the better defensive frontier. The loftier mountains are, of course, also a zonal barrier; but the lower mountain plays

an intermediate and special part. It offers often a geological, always a climatic, change from the lowland at its foot ; and the consequent differences of human physique and economic occupation increase with distance from the political core and with nearness to the frontier line, the geographical 'control'—*i.e.* the influence of the geographical conditions on Man—encouraging close similarity of type on both sides of the line. For similar reasons there must be mixture of racial type along almost any political frontier ; and there must be compromise over the impossibility of drawing a purely ethnic line, *e.g.* in Transylvania. In one case (p. 71) I suggest the advantage of drawing a frontier deliberately through a belt of mixed population.

About the position of such physical features as these, there could be no doubt or dispute, and some of them were found to be a real protection to the land marked off by them. Indeed, their character was calculated to be protective in a double way : they prevented intrusion from outside, and they focused concentration on

the full use of all resources inside them. But the area within them tended to be relatively small ; and, therefore, the frontier became a definitely racial agent, so that we may call a natural frontier also a national one. For the absence of intruders and the presence of considerable in-breeding tended to the production of a marked physical type and a marked group-consciousness or clannishness, while there was bound to follow—however slowly—some advance from a natural to an artificial basis of supply. National differences, both physiological and social, were to some extent, therefore, associated with marked physical features as frontiers ; and the influence of region on race supplies one argument for the universal adoption of politico-ethnic frontiers. Nationality is one of the fundamental elements in the problems facing the frontier-drawers of to-morrow.

Historically, the object of a natural or national frontier was to protect the group *inside* it ; it had no reference to the peoples on *both* sides, *i.e.* it was not international. The essential object of an international or artificial frontier has been, however, very

similar to that of the natural or national frontier except in the particular attitude to the land on each side. In the San Stefano Treaty there is the definite statement, “The frontier will be rectified *in order to put an end to the perpetual conflicts* between Montenegro and Turkey”; and there is an obvious expectation that this object will be furthered by the frontier following “the chain of mountains by Shlieb and north of Albania by the crests of the Kopaonik (and other heights named) to the highest peak of Prokleti.” The object would have been better attained in the particular case by a ‘scientific’ frontier, giving Montenegro a union of natural and strategic advantages which would have compelled the stronger power to fight for the *approach* to the line of greatest natural strength as represented by the ‘crest.’ But the point to which I want to draw attention, is the assumption that, in order to put an end to perpetual conflicts between two neighbours, there must be a *defensive* frontier—an assumption which has no support to-day from either Historical or Economic Geography.

In passing we may notice a further point as to the relations of the natural or national to the artificial or international type. In the evolution of important modern states, the strength and stability of a unit has usually varied with the extent to which the racial area coincided with the political area. But, historically, at some stage this coincidence of the racial with the political is met by the question of national expansion. To this question, so far as Geography is a wide and unprejudiced Outlook, there can be only one answer; and it is that the natural growth of the national unit justifies geographical expansion only in primitive times and places. Even so, as all empty spaces must some day be fully occupied, territorial expansion is only a temporary means of shirking obligations. Certainly in a mature civilisation natural growth can be legitimately met only by intensive, not by extensive development—at all events inside that area of mature civilisation.

It is under more or less primitive conditions that nationality is evolved; and, though the word may ultimately come to cover legiti-

mately great variety of race and speech, of creed and outlook, there must be a balance of definite advantages to all the various elements, as, *e.g.*, French, German, and Italian elements, all enjoy a community of freedom and good government in Switzerland. Where, however, there is a very dominant partner, permanent success must depend on the power of that partner to attract the others—to make them submerge their political, religious, linguistic, and other diversities, and to offer a substantial national gain for the diverse sectional self-denials.

The essential object of statesmanship in the delimitation of a frontier, therefore, ought to be to effect an equilibrium along it, so as to guarantee peoples meeting peacefully, and so as to prevent ascendancy intruding across even by fair means—not to mention foul means. No doubt, the difficulty of effecting this must vary with the character and density of any population along it, with the differences in physical profile of the land on opposite sides of the frontier, and with the remoteness of the frontier from its own political core. For

instance, one difficulty in the past—and it is still felt in parts of south-eastern Europe—has been the tendency of the lawless and the criminal to congregate at the farthest possible distance from the central arm of authority.

Under all the conditions of political life hitherto there has been, perhaps, only a choice of evils ; and probably the least evil was to draw a frontier line as far as possible through wide, not only uninhabited, but actually uninhabitable areas. Such areas have tended not only to defend from actual attack, but also to keep the peoples on each side of them from coming into contact ; and so far they may have minimised causes and chances of friction. But civilisation is essentially progress in the art of living together, and the rubbing off of racial and other ‘ corners ’ by constant friction with others is the greatest step to that end. Whatever the value, therefore, of an uninhabitable frontier belt, it does not favour progress in civilisation, though it is obviously better than an inhabitable frontier zone in which racial and cultural antagonisms are allowed, if not actually encouraged.

It is, however, not the destiny of the world to be for ever at war; war is not even its normal state; and the conception of the rôle of a frontier is already changing, so that in the future—perhaps not the nearest future—the principles underlying the delimitation of a frontier will be such as involve all possible aids to the peaceful meeting of nations, not to their parting.

Three points are of vital importance, as suggested in the Introductory chapter: (1) that the feature used as a frontier should be associated not with war, but with peace; (2) that the unit of area should have some direct relation to national sentiment; (3) that inability to assimilate should disqualify any Power for territorial expansion. Of these the most important is that the feature used for the frontier should be, as far as possible, one where men naturally meet. Obviously, this is not on water-partings and mountain-crests, or in deserts and swamps; and no other science has such claims as Geography to say authoritatively what, and where, such natural meeting-places are. Historical Geography accounts for the

development of a particular people in a particular area ; Political Geography relates a national type to its natural environment ; and Economic Geography presents the world as a unit, with each type in its place and each area playing its proper part. All three aspects of the science affirm that there are certain lines along which in every latitude people tend naturally to *meet in peace* ; and the most important, the most universal, and the most obvious of these is a navigable river—it is also at once indisputable, and costs absolutely nothing to delimit. Along such lines even the most discordant elements have a maximum tendency to concord. This essential fact underlies all subsequent suggestions in this little book.

But it is obviously important to remove, as far as possible, causes of discord ; and this involves two other considerations which should be kept in view.

The first is that natural political units should coincide with actual political units—the racial unit with the geographic, especially if the particular unit has proved incapable of assimilation, as *e.g.* the Alban-

ians. It is most desirable that there should be a minimum of disturbing change, and it is certain that some minorities must suffer; but the amount of change must be sufficient to meet what may be called the legitimate demands of insistent national consciousness.

The second of these subordinate considerations is that, in the choice of a new political owner for any densely inhabited area where the wish of the inhabitants cannot be made the guiding principle, full weight must be given to the capacity—or incapacity—of that proposed new owner to assimilate others.

Our frontier-lines, then, must be natural meeting-places; they must enclose national units as far as possible; and in doubtful cases the decision must be given against any fraction of population which belongs to a type proved to be incapable of assimilating others. This is the emphatic teaching of Economic Geography, and it will account for the devotion of so many pages here to Historical Geography of Prussia.

Obviously, in such an immensely complicated subject, these conditions cannot be

rigidly enforced, least of all in Europe ; there must be compromise—compromise with the land as well as with the people. But it must be compromise which recognises that there are guiding principles in Political and Physical Geography, and which is not a trick of political convenience, still less of political intrigue. It must also be a compromise which is based on scientific, not on political, evidence—*i.e.* on definite knowledge of facts studied for their own sake, not on elaborate legal formulæ devised mainly for purposes of ‘ bluff.’ For instance, the Great Powers even in the Berlin Treaty drew frontiers along features which they not only could not name or describe, but which actually proved to be non-existent.

In the face of such airy carelessness on the part of our legal luminaries, it is surely neither premature nor presumptuous to try to provoke some discussion of the principles which must underlie the new settlement that is inevitable for Europe, if not yet clearly in sight. The matter is made more important by the sapient attitude of the Foreign Office to Geography in recent years,

when—to mention only one instance—it was decided that Foreign Office and Diplomatic candidates for Civil Service Examinations *did not need to know any Geography.* No wonder that we have had curious instruction given us—with all the aplomb that graces the lawyer politicians of all our Political Parties—as to the uses and distribution of various products well known to Economic Geography!

I hope that a profound conviction of the urgent need for trying some such 'Pacifist' principles as are here recommended, may excuse—and even justify—an expression of one's grave fears about their application. For the determining factor in the success or failure of any European settlement will be the character of the experts employed on it. If they are chosen from our typical lawyer-politicians, —whose ability and integrity (not unhelpt by practised readiness, mysterious jargon, and a close corporation) enable them more or less to monopolise parliamentary honours,—facts will be subordinated to formulæ. Men who earn their daily bread—and earn it so successfully—

by proving right to be wrong or wrong to be right, are—just in proportion to their success in doing that—unfitted for work in which the great need is to observe and interpret facts for their own sake, and as they really are. The great advocate must be adroit and plausible; his instinct must be for technicalities, not for realities; his judgment on facts simply as facts, and studied for their own sake, and not in order to support a certain policy or a certain party, is curiously worthless.

Hope lies in the assurance that the settlement will be made by the Allies in concert. This may eliminate some of the dangers involved in our political tendency to sacrifice essentials to the scoring of a point; for our decadent Party System produces a plethora of politicians with an almost fatal absence of statesmen.

CHAPTER III

THE GEOGRAPHICAL KERNEL

By her original refusal to take part in the war, Italy—as the neutral least antagonistical to Germany—decided indisputably the question of who were the aggressors ; and the world is perfectly aware that the essential cause of all the political unrest in Europe for the last twenty years has been Germany, where a studiously fostered and exquisitely ridiculous sense of collective egotism has had its natural result in the obliteration of all sense of honour, of humour, even of humanity.

The presence in the geographical heart of the continent of a Power that has deified force, cunning, and corruption, is the fundamental fact, therefore, in any consideration of European frontiers ; and it raises some vital questions. They may all be based on

the fact that the geography of modern Germany, though apparently simple, is really very complex. The area, as essentially central, is in touch with both sea and land, and has felt the stimulus of both—from the Roman Empire and the Norsemen, the Steppe and the Atlantic. These stimuli, whether peaceful or otherwise, have succeeded one another in an unceasing turmoil, which has kept the area always in conscious or subconscious unrest.

This unrest has been emphasised by the diversities of surface and climate and their results. For instance, the natural divisions are of such varied size and varied character as made coherence extremely difficult. The diversity of climate—almost oceanic in the west and markedly continental in the east—again increased the tendency to disunion. There are two unifying climatic factors—a certain unity of temperature due to higher latitudes having lower altitudes, and the fact that the prevailing ‘control’ showed itself in a forest covering, giving similar economic environment in all parts of the country; but these proved actually

adverse to political unity, especially when the Low German speech of the northern lowland came to be associated with Protestantism, while the High German speech of the southern highland was associated with the Roman Church.

Of course, the diversity was destined actually to be a great asset, once political and economic unity was established; but that could not happen until the forest had been cleared. For a forest environment, with its difficulties of communication, so delayed all natural union that the area was bound to be late in political development; and the wide longitudinal expansion gave a maximum diversity of economic interest between the extreme west and the extreme east, and prevented any one place from having the dominant nodality of Paris or London or even Rome. Indeed, it is the artificial centralisation on Berlin—illustrated by the enormous proportion of railway mileage that represents trunk lines radiating impartially in all directions from Berlin—that has accelerated the economic development. So, too, the lateness of the political

development enabled Prussian industry to enter the field on the best possible lines—suggested by the experience of older nations that were themselves handicapped by the difficulty of ‘scrapping old machinery.’

To start with, however, Berlin had fewer natural advantages than Vienna, and Munich had almost as many as Cologne, while Frankfurt had the historic advantage of the central position at a great road-and-river junction which was flanked by the *Pax Romana*. It was as a Frankish adherent of Roman Christianity that Charles Martel ‘hammered’ the Saracen; and it was Papal, not Imperial, Rome that recognised a Holy and Roman Empire in the north. But expansion of this Empire only encouraged the formation of rival units within it; selection of an Emperor by Electors representing those units only sanctioned the dissension; and the unifying influence of danger at once from Moorish infidel and Norse heathen passed with the Crusades, leaving only such traces as the desire of independent towns to form certain bonds of federation. The only permanent unifying influence in

the whole area, with its diversity of relief and climate, its dual speech and dual creed, its racial confusion, has been the persistence of the Imperial Dream.

Now we may ask the first of our vital questions. It is—Why, and how, has this central Power become Prussianised and so poisoned with bestiality and barbarism? The area in question, as we have just seen, has, besides its central position, other important geographical characteristics, *e.g.* diversity of relief and climate, leading to diversity of natural products and therefore of economic interests, and these associated with diversity of tongue and creed, of racial and occupational ‘controls.’ In such an area the political superstructure—from the point of Economic Geography—should be a Confederacy of Equals, as it will be presently; but, especially in those parts most remote from the filtration of Roman ideas, there has always been an imperious need for organisation—a need recognised at different times by all the serious thinkers of all the different units of the area, and even resulting from time to time in definite attempts at

organisation by the most forceful elements. These have always been the more 'barbarous' elements—Franks, Saxons, Swabians, Hapsburgs, Hohenzollerns; and they successively inherited Roman ideals of centralisation.

But there are two extreme types of the population—found in the long-headed patriarchalist of the Prussian plain and the round-headed particularist of the Alpine highland. The latter, with his wayward artistic temperament and a non-Prussian humility and sense of humour, realised fully that his individualism hindered political coherence; and, therefore, he welcomed the organising power of the Prussian as a means of attaining the political competence and coherence which were essential to the realisation of a further ideal. *Corruptio optimi pessima!*

But who is this Prussian? A glance at the disharmonic features of his head proves that he is terribly 'handicapped' by the worst evils of cross-breeding under unfavourable circumstances; and the early history of East and West Prussia gives us

the fundamental strains. For he is the descendant—on the male side—of the turbulent robber soldiery of the Teutonic knights who conquered the area, and—on the female side—of the lowest type of outraged Lithuanian woman amongst the original inhabitants. The Lithuanian men and all the women who were not sufficiently docile, seem to have been butchered—*more Prussico*; the docile women—again *more Prussico*—met with a treatment which is made only fouler by its modern apologists in their defence of the ‘ politico-strategic ’ value of illegitimacy—their only idea of political assimilation being the outraging of a sufficient number of women to guarantee a distinct percentage of bastard population with probably Prussian leanings or instincts.

It is only fair, however, to remember that in early days all women became, and expected to become, the absolute property of the conquerors, and that to-day the Prussians do not treat their own women much better than they treat women in other countries. Their own Criminal Statistics issued in the year before the out-

break of war—a year in which we ourselves lamented in our own country 1 case of rape for every 2,000,000 of our population—tabulate for Germany *30 cases per 2,000,000 due even to males under eighteen years of age.*

Historically, then, the mongrel population which inherited the original Prussian area, perpetuated the most marked characteristics of their parents—the brutality of the male stock and the docility of the female stock. I cannot understand, therefore, why any one should have been *surprised* by anything, however brutal, that their modern representatives have done in this war. One expected that, under stress, two fundamental traits would always emerge—brutality and docility.

This human type, when fully developed, only needed a pivot and a patriarch to make it formidable; for uniformity of geographic structure, of climate and of economic occupation, gave every facility for establishing a single political unit over the whole of what we now call the Prussian plain—with a pivot on the infertile Brandenburg steppe, but financed eventually by the fertile

lowlands and mineral-bearing scarp-lands of Silesia in the east and of the Rhineland in the west. By origin and history a military organisation was necessarily imposed on the area, and its longitudinal extension involved it in both eastern and western European problems, while its river system linked northern and southern Europe. Its nucleus, however, was a barren steppe, easy to till and affording great facilities for human movement, but with a harsh climate and an ungrateful soil; and these conditions left a marked occupational 'control' upon the inhabitants. For the difficulty of survival not only led to all sorts of limited rights of inheritance and to the ejection of the feeble everywhere, but also necessitated the most constant industry and economy and the utmost organisation of all resources.

From all points of view, therefore, centralisation was a necessity; and centralised the area was—on a military basis, with Rome for model, and, for an object, the overlordship of Europe as the heir of the Roman Empire. Indeed, from the tenth to the sixteenth

centuries 'Germany' developed so strongly to the south, that she never became the heir to the Hanseatic League—for which she now blames England! For envy plays a larger part than either fear or even contempt in her present attitude to us.

From the first the steppe influence had naturally involved or perpetuated patriarchal development, with its spiritual, political, and social tyranny. As all over the Asiatic steppe, here too the weakest always went to the wall. To the fisherman of the ocean margin it seems that the weakest, just because the weakest, should have more help, not less; but to the steppe-man this is folly, and he despises the fisherman for it. On the steppe, too, always inter-tribal war has meant the butchery of the weaker, whether individuals or groups: *væ victis*. To the sailor, again, this is abhorrent; and the steppe-man despises him again for his pity.

The steppe control of human development may, indeed, be summed up as 'Kultur.' The old Latin *cultura* meant literally 'cultivation' of the soil—the industry most despicable of all in the eyes of pastoral nomads.

But the word developed two other meanings. One was 'improvement'; and by 'culture' *we* mean the individual's persistent effort to improve, enlighten, enlarge, his mental and moral horizon. A diametrically opposite meaning is preserved in 'Kultur,' a state of society where there is no real individual, but where every one belongs, body, mind, and soul, to the Patriarch; he is a demi-god, and the rest are slaves and machines.

What a foundation for a military tyranny ! And it was purely military. As in Castile, the army came to be everything, and a navy was of little importance. That was why Germany, in its effort to be the heir of the Roman Empire, failed to become the heir of the Hanseatic League. At the same time her profound inability to understand that sanctity of the ruler's word, and that freedom of individuality to the ruled, on which the Roman Empire was based, made it also impossible for her to be the heir of Rome. And, of course, the military tyranny made the man still more a machine or even the material for a machine's use—'cannon-fodder' ! Later still, after the Franco-

Prussian War, there came the forced pace of a gigantic industrial development, with the natural results—crowding into cities, deterioration in physique and morale, the further conversion of the man into the machine.

But machinery, whether it is that of a Prussian demi-god, or of the Nile in Egypt, or of a spinning-jenny in Lancashire, exercises a tyranny, and can teach nothing but what it practises. And so you get a soulless routine, the endless repetition of an endless formula. Worst of all, it essentially professes to be perfect, and therefore denies progress—progress, the fundamental law of life; and the better the machine, the more evil its effect—so that for the sake of the nation's soul we should limit the hours which our people may spend over their machines.

One result of the evil is very marked: the machine-reared person is nearly always 'cock-sure.' He gradually comes to attribute to himself the victories which he wins by the ingenuity of his machine—itself the creation of some other's mind. He often exchanges an honest self-respect for an aggressive vanity; he becomes a materialist;

he ends as himself a machine. First, he loses the power of initiative—substituting for it a belief in a necessity for ‘close order’; then he loses intellectual freedom—until we see science prostituted to the concoction of poisonous filth for an All-Highest War-Lord; lastly, he loses spiritual insight.

This has been a crowning mercy to all the Allies, but specially to us. For these people had so truly lost all spiritual instinct that they could not understand the psychological processes of any other people in the world except some typical patriarchal steppe-men in Turkey and in a corner of South Africa. And so we have two inestimable blessings: we are not isolated in fighting this great war; and we have the proved superiority of our rank and file, man by man, over the rank and file of the machine-reared Prussians. Indeed, few things are more worthy of note than the way in which the battlefield of his vaunting ambition has disproved the German’s claim to be a superman by proving him to be not even the equal of his individual opponent, whether French or Russian, Belgian or

British. Such victories as he wins, are won by means of apparatus, accumulated through years of secrecy, and by a typical violation of any honourable agreements to which he had been foolish enough to pledge his word and put his formal seal—these “scraps of paper,” whether International Treaties or Papers of Naturalisation.

This deification of the machine means more than the mere relegation of manhood to the second place—more even than the certainty that, if it fails, it fails utterly and irretrievably. It means that a passion for mechanical details—in itself a natural prelude to a passion for bombast—has given too much importance both to the automaton who is merely capable of taking pains, and nothing more, and to the amateur whose restless vanity, by contrast, can pose as genius. It makes magnates of mediocrities ; it reduces espionage to an elaborate industry ; it enables petty envy to masquerade as imperial policy, and a fanatical egoist to submerge internal menace to his tyranny under national absorption in external expansion.

CHAPTER IV

THE POWER OF ASSIMILATION

It is inconceivable that such a people should have any power of assimilating others. People who are eaten up with vanity and egotism, never find it easy to understand others; and, in this particular case, neither the racial origin nor the national history suggests an attractive personality. But there are extenuating circumstances.

The forested morainic plain of the race-home had frontiers that were peculiarly vague; and these reacted adversely on the Germans, because their eastern neighbours were at once very wild and at a very low stage of civilisation. The Germans had, therefore, to devote their whole energies to the one end of defence; they became accustomed to exceedingly savage warfare; and they learnt to regard themselves as immeasurably 'superior.'

Later on, their central position, with its natural control of the Rhine and Danube links between Northern and Southern Europe received such a blow when the wealth of the Orient was diverted to the sea route, that they were thrown back centuries economically. An obvious means of recuperating was found by the petty princes of the area in stopping the drain of wealth to the Roman Church and in seizing her rich possessions; and the absence of any wide traditions from Imperial Rome facilitated revolt against Ecclesiastical Rome. But all this led to internal divisions of a kind which so impoverished the people and retarded their development, while enriching and magnifying the importance of the petty princes, that Germany is still in the tribal stage of political and religious evolution.

With such leaders, how could a people already so handicapped by origin and history hope to become Imperial in any worthy sense? Professor Cramb thought that "the Germans' dream of empire is the cause of hate and of an unavoidable duel between two Imperial races." Surely one may take

leave to deny that both of two opposing types can be truly imperial, and to question the imperial character of the Germans. The test of an imperial type is not the power to conquer, least of all to conquer small and weak nations taken by surprise, but the power to attract and assimilate after a conquest which has been forced on the conqueror. And the Germans have proved their inability to either attract or assimilate. Even to their own allies in Hungary and Italy they are obnoxious; even in Polish Galicia, where the Poles have had better treatment than any other nationality subjected to German rulers, in every second window you could have seen for years past the urgent appeal, "Buy nothing German!" For the unattractive Prussian personality is associated with a fixed belief in racial superiority, and the belief is a real belief—it is acted on. Indeed, it is quite typical of a patriarchal people, especially when nomadism has given place to sedentary life, to consider themselves as a Chosen People with very intimate relations to an anthropomorphic Deity. But it does

not increase their power of attracting, or give them any claim to be considered imperial.

The essential considerations are brought out by contrasting the German with any really Imperial people, *e.g.* the French ; and their treatment of any one of their 'inferior' neighbours will supply illustrations.

In this connection the Dutch frontiers have points of special interest. The obvious encroachments of the Prussian territory seaward, where the frontier crosses the great rivers, are an eloquent tribute to the historic importance of the Dutch harbours, although to-day Zwolle and Kampen have not a tithe of their historic value as ports. A second point is the change in value of the Bourtanger frontier since the draining of the Bourtanger marsh—an admirable frontier in days when defensive frontiers were normal. Now that the natural barrier of marsh is no longer present, the right line is the Ems itself ; and this raises the question of the estuary of that river.

German map-makers lately, following the German Staff Map of 1911 (sheet 172), have printed the international frontier on the Dollart as a *land* line along the coast of

Holland, thus making the whole estuary Prussian. Of course, in International Law and usage the estuary is 'an arm of the sea,' open to all nations without restriction—which minimises the strategic value of Emden—and the frontier is the centre line, the fairway; and, as a matter of fact, the Dutch pay exactly half the total cost of lighting it. The German claim is denied by Holland, and the matter is still 'under discussion'—according to the official Dutch statement. And there is a certain amount of difficulty, because the seasonal régime of the river varies the fairway from one side of a certain sand-bank to the other; but, at all events, the line is not a *land* line. *Ex uno disce omnia!*

Reference to the Germano-Danish frontier emphasises the unpleasant impression left by the cartographic manipulation of the Germano-Dutch frontier. For the Danish frontier is politically quite artificial, geographically most appropriate, historically very significant. The Schleswig isthmus was of great importance in the earliest times, being, for instance, the gate through which Christianity passed northward into the

country, and being farthest from the danger zone of the Baltic; the North Sea coast of Jutland, by its structure and owing to its climate, has always been very dangerous; and in early times the safest approach from the south was in the lee of the North Frisian islands, *i.e.* to the old port of Ribe. With the development of Prussia, Denmark was bound to be dislodged from the right bank of the Elbe; and, as the Eider valley had been a scene of constant struggle for nearly a thousand years, it was difficult to draw a frontier through it.

But for Bismarck's deliberate equivocation,¹ which made Denmark hold out in 1864, a European Congress would undoubtedly have given Schleswig to Denmark, and the Holstein fief of the old Empire would have gone to Prussia; but "a people who could be so easily deceived once, deserved to be deceived again." So he proposed to leave the decision to the "free vote of the Schleswig people"; but, before the vote could be

¹ That Britain had threatened Prussia with armed intervention, when—to quote his own cynical boast subsequently—"she had, as a matter of fact, done nothing of the kind."

taken, he had flooded the area with so many Prussians that its inclusion in Denmark became impossible. Under the circumstances the best compromise was to draw the frontier where the Prussian influence died out—on the barren heath of Ribe, which happened to be also almost the narrowest reach of the peninsula, some thirty-six miles across; but the seaward ends of the frontier had to dip southward far enough to include on the North Sea the old port of Ribe, and on the Baltic the entrance to the very narrow Fredericia Strait by which Jutland is linked to Fünen.

The Schleswig people in question number only some 150,000; they have never received any political encouragement from the little motherland of Denmark; they are of the same creed and of rather the same racial type as their Prussian masters. But ever since the settlement they have been systematically persecuted; many children born since then are *outside the law of the land* except for military and other civic service; in 1913 a Norwegian explorer was forbidden—though the prohibition was eventually

withdrawn—to lecture in the Duchy in his own language, because it was “too closely akin to the prohibited Danish language.” When the present war broke out, the Schleswig units were sent to the eastern front for fear of desertion; and many non-combatants, including women, were arrested on “suspicion of treason.” This is only the last chapter in a whole volume of historic persecution which—so far from Prussianising them—has only embittered a racial antagonism that existed before the Angles left Angeln. But what signs are there here of an imperial people?

If we turn to the eastern frontier, we find a similar picture. What has happened along the Vistula, is less well known than what has happened along the Rhine; but Posen has been the Alsace of the east, with many a Zabern. In some ways, indeed, the treatment of the Poles has been the worse. Two instances are sufficient to show how contemptible and how hateful the tyranny has been. On the one hand, Prussian postmen were allowed, if not encouraged, to refuse to deliver letters addressed in Polish; on the other, Roman Catholic parents have been imprisoned, and

their children have been thrashed, for refusing to say the Lord's Prayer in German to Prussian Protestant teachers.

The same contrast is seen between the attitude of Italians in a non-Prussianised Ticino and their attitude in a Prussianised Trentino. In both cases the basis is linguistically, racially, culturally, and economically, Italian ; but in the one case the Italians are content to be Swiss, while in the other case they are not content to be Austrian.

But the utter lack of any true imperial sense comes out most vividly on the western frontier in relation to areas which at different times have been German and French ; and the treatment of the people in each case should be viewed in the light of the geographical conditions.

The precise character of the Belgian and Luxemburg frontiers, when neutrality is maintained and respected, is of no importance ; and, Belgian sympathies being naturally with France, *as the Power with the genius for assimilating*, the absence of marked physical features is a great economic advantage, while the topographical vagaries

of the arbitrary line are mementoes of hostility only between France and Spain, not between the French and the Belgians. At the same time the relation of both countries to the Rhine is of great moment.

From Basel to the sea the western water-parting of the Rhine basin, like the eastern, forms scarcely anywhere a marked physical obstacle or barrier. In the past, therefore, all attempts to make the basin a separate political unit have failed ; and, so long as separate political existence depended on, or has been closely associated with, an easily defensible frontier, they must have failed. In the future, however much human characteristics may be modified, the shape of the basin will be entirely adverse to its forming a good political unit.

Historically, its banks from the Alps to the sea have been held by people of the same Teutonic type ; its basin from north to south has been divided into separate political units ; and it has been for centuries a bone of contention between its western and eastern neighbours. Geographically, there is little more justification for its being politically

partitioned from south to north than from west to east ; and, as a bone of contention, it would be best divided appropriately between the two claimants. What does one mean by appropriately ?

Besides its natural advantage as the chief waterway of Europe, the Rhine inherited a Roman organisation, and bequeathed to the French a belief in its rôle as a Romance frontier. Because it had been a useful line to the Romans in an unknown land, at once a natural defence and forming a frontier without need of demarcation and without possibility of dispute, it tended to become an ethnic frontier *in sentiment*, if not in fact. The partition of Charlemagne's empire confirmed this by giving the first step towards the separate nationality of France ; and Lothair retained, with the Imperial title, what we may henceforth call the French bank. The western Rhine-bank territories presently split up into an upper and lower duchy, which we may call provisionally Lorraine and 'Belgium'—using the latter word almost in the sense in which Cæsar might have used it ; but both remained Roman and French in

essence. On the other side of the river, where the Alpine type of man was in force, the land was parcelled out characteristically into a number of small, mutually hostile and practically independent principalities.

The Alpine type spread down the outliers of the Alps—from Bavaria, through Alsace and Luxemburg, to Walloon Belgium; but wherever it came into contact with the insinuating and attractive personality of France, it was assimilated, as easily as the insinuating French tongue crept down the Alpine passes into Piedmont, and became the basis of a natural political bond between Piedmont and Savoy. For wherever any object-lessons gave opportunity for comparison, *e.g.* the trail of the rival armies or rival traders through the land, the French influence attracted, and the Prussian repelled. Impartial evidence from the days of Froissart to those of Wellington proves that it was *because* southern Belgium became a highway in peace and in war, that its sympathies became French, not German. So in Lorraine the post-Reformation acquisition of the three bishoprics by France only

converted people who were German by race and by speech, into worshippers of France; and in Alsace the bare-faced robberies of Louis XIV. did not change the speech or the creed of Protestants who traced down an unbroken German descent from the deadliest enemies of Rome, but it made them French to the core in sentiment. Does any one need more proof of the power of France to assimilate? If the proof is sufficient, change of frontier eastward in the middle basin of the Rhine will cause no permanent sore.

Even away beyond the eastern frontier of Germany the glamour of France is still felt—among the Russian Poles; and yet further—beyond the Atlantic—it is the one deep European influence in the United States, and its influence has been steadily deepening, though the percentage of French elements in the country has fallen, and the percentage of German elements has greatly increased. It is precisely because there was in France a gratified consciousness of this feeling throughout the States, that France resented so bitterly President Wilson's failure to put himself at

the head of all neutral peoples at the very beginning of the war, and assert that the outrages proved against the Germans should cease instantly. There can be little question that, had he—or the Pope—done so, the world would have been spared all subsequent outbursts of bestial barbarism. On the contrary, the President's failure to protest to either side until a relatively slight illegality on one side touched American pockets, only encouraged such outbursts.

Germans have conspicuously failed, then, to convert Danes and Poles into Germans; they have failed to keep Germans true to type in Alsace and Lorraine; they have failed to make them Germans again when Alsace and Lorraine were recovered. And the reason is that they are essentially lacking in the imperial faculty of assimilation, and that their machine-bound psychology makes them incapable of distinguishing between a paralysing uniformity, imposed with the ubiquitous uniform, and an imperial unity, based on an untrammelled diversity of detail such as draws the best freely from many sources.

This must be taken into first consideration by all future frontier-drawers, for history would only repeat itself. There have been 'German' Empires; and they are all dead and dishonoured, because their ideal was slavery, not assimilation. Indeed, Professor Cramb admitted that under the Hohenstaufens Italy had been treated more vilely than Ireland had been by England even at the worst,—that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries German Imperialism meant the complete obliteration of Italian art, letters, science, religion, and patriotism,—that in the nineteenth century the name of Metternich was synonymous with a burden of reaction and oppression under which the chief instruments of government were the dungeon and the fortress.

It is quite in keeping with this that German merchants in recent years have been actually advocating the abandonment of Kiau-Chau—on the ground that German *political* relations with Peking had so prejudiced the Chinese against everything German that it was becoming more and more difficult to do business with them!

No doubt, it has been intensely galling to Chinese gentlemen to be hectored by Prussian parvenus ; but the good merchants should also remember that two years after the German acquisition of Kiau-Chau there was a war in China. During that war China had object-lessons, such as Belgium has had for centuries ; for, of all the troops employed, only the German contingent defiled alike the place, the people, the century, and the name of Europe. General Wilson, the commander of the U.S.A. contingent, reported of his German allies : “ The atrocities perpetrated by the Germans, especially as regards women, were something too atrocious for record ; and, moreover, were unblushingly acknowledged as a regular feature of war.” So, too, the Duke of Wellington had recorded a century earlier of his Prussian allies : “ From the general down to the smallest drummer-boy in their Legion the earth never groaned with such a lot of murdering, infamous villains. They murdered, robbed, and ill-treated the peasantry wherever they went.”

Domination may be won for the moment

by courage, industry, and organisation—all typical Prussian traits; but Empire can only be kept by sympathy, patience, self-control—qualities all quite alien to the typical Prussian official. Perhaps he is not personally altogether to blame; for even on his utmost frontier he has been trained within the grip of the Government machine.

On the scarp of an Asian plateau, or in the heart of an African jungle, the sentinels of our own far-flung frontier have been for generations beyond the paralysing grip of the machine, and have learnt and handed down the lessons by which Empire is given to man. They are lessons of conciliation as well as of courage, of initiative as well as of industry, of patience as well as of precision, of sympathy with local cultures as well as of a serene conviction of racial superiority, and of self-control sufficient to prevent you even wishing to impair any *genius loci*, still less wishing to impose a political idolatry on alien and unwilling worshippers. Such lessons are not easily learnt by a patriarchal automaton trained within telephone reach of the headquarters of the Government

machine—still less when every influence has combined to make him see foreign lands and foreign peoples through a maniacal distortion of vision, to develop pose at the expense of poise, and to be actually proud of the national inability to assimilate. Indeed, that typically Prussian official, Professor Neumann, ‘proves’ the decadence of the English language by its *inability to avoid absorbing foreign words*—“such insidious interlopers as monsoon and verandah”!

If this analysis is sound, its essential meaning may be translated into some definite assertions. Germany plotted the downfall of Britain, and *therefore* could not believe that we were not plotting her downfall; just as she could not believe the *Lusitania* was not armed *because* she had—under false manifest and even before the outbreak of war—armed her own merchantmen. She desired the downfall of any and every other State by whose downfall she could profit. It is the Teuton, therefore, not the Slav, that has been aggressive; and it is Teutonic aggression that has roused the spirit of Slav democracy to strike for freedom.

Professor Herbertson has summed up admirably—as one would expect—the geographer's attitude to the whole question :

“ Those of us who have come to believe that the living world is what we study, and that the marvellous vital associations of every neighbourhood, district, and region are its most precious elements, feel that the loss (in the battle area) is more than that of monuments or of men. It is the systematic degradation of the neighbourhoods, districts, regions as wholes—not merely of this or that part of them—that is most terrible and unjustifiable. The crime against the whole is greater than the sum of the crimes against the separate parts. The society of any region—which tries to destroy the *genius loci* of some other region, and to impose its own traditions on that other region, is committing one of the gravest crimes. As geographers, it is our business to discover, describe, and explain regional characteristics ; it is our privilege to awaken regional consciousness which respects its own traditions and characteristics ; and it is our duty to cultivate regional consciousness which, while doing all it can for the development of itself, respects the rights of other regions, and knows that, only by mutual understanding and co-operation in construction with other regions, and not

by hatred and attempts at their destruction, can any sound progress be accomplished. Many of us believe that the British Empire is doing this for part of the world, though still subconsciously and inadequately."

To that I would venture to add a word, if one may possibly do so without spoiling it. It is that every land has this *genius loci*, a Holy Spirit of its own, and it is indestructible. You can burn its crops, batter down its ancient shrines and homes of peace, butcher its children; but you cannot destroy the immortal spirit. It is a sin to try to do so. In the last hundred years not even the Turks have attempted this; only the Prussians have done so, they always did so, and they always would do so. Let frontier-drawers beware !

CHAPTER V

NORTHERN FRONTIERS

ALSACE-LORRAINE

THREE facts are indisputable about Alsace : speech is no guide to ' national ' sentiment, for German is spoken by 85 per cent. of the population ; the whole eastern frontier faces what is, in the character of its traffic, an international waterway ; and the greater part of the essentially Germanic population consists of officials who are not natives of the area.

Behind the bare facts there is a profound significance. France was far too truly imperial to try to change the speech of the area, but ever since the sixteenth century French has steadily, if slowly, penetrated eastward. A similar movement in Lorraine, where there is no physical barrier, is scarcely

surprising, though the percentage of French-speaking people is extraordinarily high in some places, *e.g.* between 20 and 30 per cent. in many places north and north-east of Metz, and even between 60 and 70 per cent. in one or two places south-east of Metz. But in Alsace, where the forested Vosges are a very real barrier, it is surprising to find French steadily creeping down the eastern slope in the teeth of fierce political hostility, until now the percentage of French-speaking people is well over 20 in many places and over 30 in one or two. There is no area outside the present political frontier of Germany where the same can be said of the German language.

Analysis of the essentially Germanic population lays bare another significant phenomenon. Practically the whole of the non-official element in it represents immigrants from other parts of Germany, who were sent to Alsace—as to Lorraine—with the express object of Germanising the Alsatians; but the political missionaries have themselves succumbed to the fascination of French ideals, and have been recently

siding with the Alsatians. Nor—when one remembers the amenities of Zabern—can one feel astonished at their conversion.

Further, as we have seen (p. 47), the real Alsatians are French to the core in sentiment; and the only frontier in the whole area which is appropriate to modern ideals of life or even to modern conditions of peaceful international relations, is the Rhine. Alsace should, therefore, be French; and its eastern frontier should be the Rhine, as the line to which all human activities naturally gravitate. And, if the day of political force and fraud is done, the old military points of vantage will cease to count except so far as they imply economic possibilities of trade and industry, of human health and lovely scenery,—under the influence of a Power with a genius for assimilating alien types.

This is not to say that we may ignore national sentiment in completing the frontier. On the contrary, both national sentiment and economic interest must be related to geographical features. These include the lowland area of the Lorraine Gate between

the Hardt and the Vosges, the natural line of least resistance marked by the Zorn and the Kinzig valleys, and its complementary economic feature in the Rhine-and-Marne canal. This canal divides approximately the Alsace hop-lands from the Palatinate tobacco-lands, as the Saar divides the Lorraine hop-lands from the Palatinate grain-lands. So the frontier should run along the canal to the Saar, and then along the Saar to the point where the Moselle leaves the Luxemburg frontier. South of the canal and west of the Rhine there is no appreciable percentage of Germanic sentiment—in a population of 1,800,000; and it is better that the appreciable percentage of Germanic sentiment west of the Saar should come under a Power with a genius for assimilation than that the at least equally appreciable percentage of French sentiment should remain under a Power with no such genius.

A word as to History. Throughout the book it is assumed that historic claims which are simply historic, and have long outlived real sentiment, may be ignored, *e.g.* in the case of Venetian relations with any par-

ticular Dalmatian town. This attitude is specially necessary with regard to the history of Alsace-Lorraine as written by Prussians, for they systematically ignore such significant facts as are concealed in the municipal records of, *e.g.*, Metz, where a list of 115 twelfth-century magistrates contains only three names that are obviously German.

BELGIUM

As far as the Germano-Belgian frontier is concerned, there is only one essential change to be made; and that is to include the *whole* of the Moresnet zinc and lead area inside Belgium, so that a dual control may no longer give opportunity for intrigue and arrogance. It may also be assumed that the 'heavy' German railway, which I have described elsewhere (in 1911) as

"running parallel to, and within one mile of, the Belgian frontier" will be destroyed. "Along it there is a station every three miles; and at these stations there is sufficient 'loop' accommodation to allow from half a dozen to a dozen long troop trains to be side-tracked, and—without blocking the through-traffic on the

main line—from 5000 to 10,000 men to be detrained, with all their immediate impedimenta. In each case, too, the sidings are provided with high platforms and all other necessary apparatus for detraining horses, guns, and wagons. These stations are, of course, close to the admirable roads which the Belgians have run through the Ardennes to encourage tourist traffic.”

These are also in an area—between Montjoie and the Belgo-Luxemburg frontier—which, though politically German, is French by speech ; and they were used with deadly effect at the beginning of this war. The genesis, progress, and completion of this great railway, with its half a dozen little trains in the twenty-four hours, were all reported to, and therefore well known to, our lawyer politicians ; but in their own minds these Solomons removed the danger with a formula, and ‘bluffed’ the nation about the fundamental facts.

There are two other obvious abnormalities in the Belgian frontiers. The eastern one can scarcely be amended, as the subterranean labyrinth in the old Roman quarries at Maastricht (‘Maas-traject’) is

so deeply associated in sentiment with the 'Dutch' refugees from the political and religious tyranny of Spain, that Holland could not be asked to give up that detached lobe of territory. But the western one only represents an unworthy and successful determination of Holland to exclude Belgium, as the weaker party in 1830, from the polders and tidal water.

HOLLAND


Of course, Holland should be compensated if she would hand over this little strip (about the size of Middlesex) to Belgium; and the compensation should be in the form of a straightening out of the curves in her eastern frontier caused by the Prussian 'push' down the littoral of the Rhine and the Vecht. In the case of the Rhine the frontier should start at the extreme west of the present provincial frontier between Westphalia and the Rhineland, and should run, by the line of minimum population, to the most easterly bend on the Maas. In the case of the Vecht there is an opportunity of again adopting a river-frontier. The old

frontier was, as we have seen, in reality the Bourtanger marsh, an admirable defensive belt ; but, now that the marsh has been drained, the desirable frontier is the Ems.

The present line of the Dortmund-Ems Canal, and the deliberate attempt (on the German Staff Map in 1911) to falsify the Dutch frontier, were both connected with the intention of making Emden a great military centre in the lee of the great naval station of Borkum. It has, of course, been provided with very large military barracks and with enormous wharfage, equipped for the accommodation of transports, as well as with the canal direct to the Krupp works at Essen. Any change which corrects such an arrangement, must make for security to all neighbouring Powers.

HANOVER

We may hope, too, that the end of the war will see a new kingdom between the Ems and the Elbe. For the Weser basin is very loosely connected with the Prussian plain. As a commercial link between upper and lower Germany, it is unimportant ; as



----- PRESENT FRONTIERS.

..... PROPOSED CHANGES.

a military link between Rhine and Elbe, it is turned by the longitudinal basin of the Main; as an ethnic link, it is much more akin to Denmark or even Holland than to the Slavonised Teutons of Prussia, with their dense subject population of Teutonised Slavs, or to the Alpine types of the south. Its tall, fair-haired 'Longheads' are of very pure Nordic type, with very strong affection for their Protestant creed and a characteristically 'Viking' preponderance of male over female births—a unique phenomenon in Germany. A Kingdom of Hanover, marching with Denmark on the Eider and with Holland on the Ems, would guarantee to the Danes and the Dutch and their neighbours a maximum of friendly relations, based on essential similarity of human type and considerable sympathy of political ideals.

SCHLESWIG

The question of the Schleswig portion is not quite a simple one, for there is a considerable German element in the south and south-east, which is flanked by the Kiel Canal. But the German element has suf-

ferred so much from the Prussian 'mailed fist' that the sympathies of a large proportion are strongly with the Danish element; and so long as Germany retains full economic profit from the canal, it is to the advantage



AREA OF GERMANIC POPULATION 'RULED.'

of the whole world that she should lose its strategic possibilities. Both ends would be attained by adopting the old historic frontier (between Schleswig and Holstein) of the Eider up to the limit of tide at Rendsborg,

and then the left bank of the canal. Europe might contribute to the upkeep and the fortification of the Danish portion of the west bank; the German fortress of Kiel could prevent hostile attack from the Baltic on the canal itself; and the Dano-European fortifications could effectively guarantee the Baltic peoples against any treacherous use of the canal by German men-of-war.

The objection to this frontier is that there is a distinctly German 'enclave' eastward of the north-and-south line of the Treene tributary of the Eider and south of the Schleswig (or Slien) 'fiord,' and this extends along the north bank of the Eider and over the Tönning peninsula to the North Sea. North of this 'enclave' as far as the Flensburg 'fiord' there is a mixed Dano-German population, and west of the Treene there is a mixed Frisio-German population.

In the case of these mixed populations one would have no hesitation whatever in applying the principle laid down above (p. 17)—that in such cases the decision must be given against the portion of population which belongs to a type proved in-

capable of assimilating others. In the case of the definitely German area, it is quite impossible—under the political conditions of German rule—to have any proof of the real sympathies or wishes of the people, for the system of domestic espionage is perhaps stronger here than anywhere else in Germany except Alsace. On the other hand, there is no difficulty at all in estimating the value which Germany attaches to treaties and other ‘scraps of paper’ that bear her signature; and the protection of the Baltic peoples against any typical misuse of the Kiel Canal by Germany is of more importance to the world than the sympathies of a few thousand Germans.

The frontier should, therefore, be brought down to the canal, which would provide such a line of natural concentration in times of peace as we require for a frontier feature. And at least the line has the sanction of 1500 or 1600 years! For, as the *Ägyr Dör* (“Neptune’s Gate”), it was a frontier down to the time of Charlemagne; and for a thousand years after Charlemagne, it was known as the *Romani Terminus Imperii*.

POLAND

For two thousand years the Vistula basin has been specifically and continuously Polish, although the featureless lowland is curiously devoid of the defensive features—other than marshes—which were normally looked upon as ‘good’ frontiers; and the explanation is, no doubt, to be found in the combination of fertile land and easy communications—both by land and by water—inside the natural unit of a fairly large river basin, with its natural unit of speech.

The lack of barrier features favoured both invasion from outside and expansion from within; and, while the former ended in political dismemberment, the latter has led to the complete monopoly by the Poles of the whole upper and middle basin of the Warta. Even in the important strategic ‘circle’ of Posen drastic educational tyranny, wholesale confiscation of Polish estates, and every means for expatriating Poles, have not yet reduced the Polish population to less than 80 per cent. of the whole; and the tenacity of race and

speech is accompanied by equal tenacity of Roman creed—between the Orthodox Russians and the nominally Protestant Prussians. It is significant, however, that all typically Polish elements die out on the Carpathian foothills, being replaced—between the Dukla Pass and Jaroslav—by Ruthenians. And, except for a few miles north-west of Dantzic, there is a similar absence of Poles along the Baltic coast. But practically the whole area between 50° and 54° N. and 18° and 23° E. is a solid block of Roman Catholic Poles, whose tenacity of race and speech and creed is associated with a prodigious fecundity.

The Prussian treatment of the Poles before and during the war has had two results most valuable for the future peace of Europe. The one was that it drew all the diverse and often antagonistic elements of Polish nationality into a unity that aimed at common defence of a common creed, and resulted in effective co-operation towards economic and political solidarity; the other has been the still less expected *rapprochement* with Russia.

As a matter of fact, this *rapprochement* has

such a logical—if hitherto little recognised—basis in Russia's economic dependence on Poland, that its permanent importance can scarcely be doubted, or its immense value be over-rated. For it is obviously impracticable that there should be an independent Polish kingdom—at least until Europe is satisfied that the days of frenzied ambition and political intrigue are gone for ever. And our principles of action find here a particularly favourable field.

For the Pole is equally antagonistic by creed to the nominally Lutheran Prussian and to the deeply Orthodox Russian; he is drawn economically by his great commercial river to Prussia, and by his still greater industrial coal-field to Russia; and he has decided, even in Galicia, “Unity first; then, perhaps, Independence!” It remains for us to find a line which will represent at once Polish nationality and the Russian Empire. The two considerations are the limits of the Polish elements and the Economic Geography.

The latter at once suggests a line right through the middle of the Masurian lakeland.

For the physical history of the area, as a typical morainic platform, makes it exceedingly intricate in topography; and the Masurians are Poles by race and German by speech,—*e.g.* Allenstein speaking Polish while Eylau speaks German,—while their frontier site and forest environment have encouraged a hardy and independent type with no marked leanings to either Prussia or Poland.

The actual line should run from the lee of the Seesker Berg, where it now turns south-south-*east*, in a south-south-*west* and then a south-west direction through the maze of lakes to the lee of the Kernsdorfer Höhe. There it should drop to the line of the Derwenz, and follow that river along to its confluence with the Vistula; and then it should follow the Vistula along to the nearest point on it to the Netze, or possibly follow the Bromberger canal to Nakel. The Netze should be followed to its confluence with the Warta, the Warta to the confluence of the Obra, and the Obra practically to its source near Jarotschin. Through the difficult, thinly-peopled land between this point and the confluence of the Malapane with

the Oder, the line might run through the belt of minimum population; and from the Oder-Malapané confluence it should follow the Oder and its Olsa tributary up to the water-parting of the Carpathians.

This would sacrifice certain German enclaves in the west, especially in Posen, and certain Polish enclaves in the east, especially in Galicia and along the entire western flank of the Vistula from Bromberg to the Baltic; but it would represent a unit of nationality with its rightful possibilities both political and economic, transferring about 3,000,000 Poles from Germany to Russia. One would assume also that an end would be put to the preposterous arrangement by which Russia is cut off from the right bank of the Lower Niemen. From the Seesker the frontier would run, as at present, to the Szeszuppe; but, instead of crossing the stream and working northwards, it should adhere to it down to its confluence with the Niemen. It should then follow the Niemen down to the Kurische Haff and the eastern coastal waters of the latter to the Baltic, thus making Memel rightly and permanently Russian.



----- PRESENT FRONTIERS.
 PROPOSED CHANGES.

It is obvious that in this northern area the really important factors are the frontiers of the two Great Powers, France and Russia ; for the smaller States have nothing to fear from the people of either, and do not fear anything from France. It is equally obvious that in the southern area it will be essential to make the 'minor' States as large and as strong as possible, so as to minimise the danger of foreign intrigue or attack, and to give maximum influence to all that makes for love of liberty—whether their own or that of other people. For instance, the cause of true liberty in Germany would be aided by the inclusion of Austria in a South German League, which would put an end promptly to the hegemony of Prussia. And territorial expansion—even apart from the concomitant 'fulfilment of racial destiny'—will inevitably make the consciousness of nationality less intense, and therefore less militant. Cf. p. 92.

CHAPTER VI

SOUTHERN FRONTIERS

ON the Baltic front, then, the problem is comparatively clear and simple; for the distribution of useful geographical features, especially the larger rivers, corresponds closely, though it does not actually coincide, with the distribution of the human elements. But on the Balkan front the case is very different, a profoundly intricate geography involving an exceedingly confused distribution of nationalities; and everywhere there must be compromise—with the land and with its inhabitants.

One special difficulty in the physical geography is that the lines of least resistance are seldom the valleys of navigable rivers—at least not for any considerable distance; indeed, many important valleys

are not the work of rivers at all, but due to earth-movements.

There is also a special difficulty in the economic geography — a difficulty of a double kind. On the one hand, the Balkan peoples have been so much engrossed and overstrained in the struggle to express and to safeguard their national existence that they have had neither power nor leisure for economic development. And this has vitiated national ideals by a gross, if excusable, selfishness of national aims, while it has left the whole area at the mercy of foreign intriguers. The special business of these gentlemen has been to foster the narrow ambitions of the German princes who are at the head of the various States, and who are naturally contaminated with the poison of Prussian models and methods.

On the other hand, the rise of the national sentiment is itself just a proof that education and international intercourse are awakening the peoples in the area; and, though the first awakening—thanks to the foreign intrigues, and specially in the case of the gallant, but misguided, Bulgarians—was

to a realisation of the antagonism of their various political interests, the later awakening is to a realisation of the wide identity of economic interests. Full realisation of this waits on reparation for the injustice done, by the treaty of Bukarest, to the real conquerors of the Turk, those same Bulgarians; and we must admit that it was done 'justifiably'—in revenge for their leaders' criminal stupidity in listening to the Teutonic snake. Once that injustice is generously repaired, the ground should be ready for a Customs Union of the whole area—so far, but only so far, as it is Græco-Slav. This is not to say that Italy has no claims against the Teutonic intriguers, but only that the Union should be essentially Balkan.

The political and economic confusion is least, of course, where the geographical conditions are simplest—*i.e.* outside of what is technically Balkan; and on the two extreme flanks there can be little doubt about what should be done, though there may be considerable difficulty in doing it—at all events, in the east.

ITALY

As a matter of fact, there are some real defects of the Italian frontier, especially in the Ticino and the Adige basins. Both are linguistically, culturally, economically, and ethnically Italian — 135,000 out of 140,000 in the Swiss territory being 'Italian.' And, though they have long forgotten the harsh treatment which they received from the Uri highlanders in the early days of their annexation, the fact that this wedge of linguistically, culturally, economically, and ethnically Italian population coincides with a well-marked geographical unit, would justify its being politically Italian.

The only defence of the present arrangement is that the valleys of the Reuss and the Ticino may be considered to make a single land-form, which may be called the St. Gothard 'bridge,' and which has its termini on such natural meeting-places of peoples as two great lakes, those of Lago Maggiore and the Lake of Lucerne. The fact that the Swiss had the reverse slope slightly favoured them ; the lake is a natural

meeting-place ; and the frontier approaches the lake on both sides through a belt of minimum population. Again, the fact that the Swiss depend on foreign nations on every side for access to the outside world, guarantees their practical neutrality, so that it matters little whether they do, or do not, own the Ticino basin ; but, theoretically, there is not a shadow of doubt that the whole Val Levantina should be Italian politically, just as the whole area in Austria west of the Arlberg should be Swiss.

Even more than the Ticino valley has the Adige valley been a great thoroughfare, and the Brenner is still the first pass eastward *over* which a railway can be used in winter ; but, of course, the terminus of the river route is not on Lake Garda. Economically, therefore, one accepts the Austrian frontier crossing the lake, especially as it approaches the lake on both sides through a belt of minimum population ; but politically one cannot accept the frontier in the Adige valley. Here, as in the Ticino valley, the ethnic, linguistic,¹ cultural, and even economic type is essentially

¹ German is the Trade speech as far as Salurn.

Italian—as far as the limit of navigation at the confluence of the Eisack, represented by Botzen, and such a natural head of traffic is a natural meeting-place. And every conceivable strategic consideration demands that foreign rulers of part of the Adige basin should not have access, by the Val Sugana, to what ought to be the purely Italian basin of the Brenta.

As a matter of fact, the Austro-Italian frontier of 1866 was settled to run along the old frontier of the Lombardo-Venetian province. From the Italian point of view this was a distinct improvement on the frontier laid down by the Treaty of Zurich in 1859, which ran down the centre of Lake Garda, and then due south immediately west of Mantua; and it was a fairly correct hinterland for Venice, though the actual frontier was stupidly kept inside the ‘Venetian’ water-parting in both the north-west and the north-east—in spite of the Commissioners having been instructed to pay special attention to “operations which might render the State separation more manifest.”

In the south-east of this 'Venetian' area the general frontier lies parallel with the water-parting of the Isonzo, as on the Franco-Italian frontier in the west it lies parallel with that of the Var; and the nationality of the relatively few Italians of the coast east of the Istrian karst could not reasonably weigh as much as, still less more than, that of the vast non-Italian population of a hinterland which could reach the sea only on the Gulf of Trieste or the Gulf of Quarnero.

The same is true of the Dalmatian coast. The total Italian population in Dalmatia does not reach 20,000 persons, and its distribution is quite local, being confined entirely to the coastal lowlands, and being even there concentrated in the towns. Everywhere behind the coast, and on the coast itself where the lowlands give place to highlands, the population is Slav; but, whether the original Slavs were colonists planted here as terrace-cultivators, or were refugees from tyranny in the hinterland, they were more or less under the protection of Italy, and their commercial relations with the outside world

were conducted by Italian sailors and in the Italian language. Now that communication with the hinterland is relatively easy, and that the hinterland itself is passing into the possession of a Slav Power, the natural tendency of the coastland politically is to its own geographical hinterland.

Physical, climatic, and ethnic causes demand, then, that the Italian frontier should include the Isonzo basin, and run along the Karst proper to the apex of Monte Maggiore (4600 feet) on the Gulf of Quarnero, thus giving both Trieste and Pola, but not Fiume, to Italy; and similar considerations give Dalmatia to Serbia. Political expediency may counsel leaving to Austria real as well as nominal access to the Adriatic, as represented by the fine natural harbour of Pola—but only as a commercial centre, with dismantled fortifications.

HUNGARY

The key to all the rest really lies with Hungary, where the physical basis is specially simple, but the political issues are momentous.

In the discussion which followed the original lecture, Mr. Mackinder said :

“ Think what the Hungarians could do at the present moment, were they to place themselves at the head of a great movement for the federation of South-Eastern Europe. They would have to start by surrendering the Rumanians of Transylvania to Rumania, and by coming to terms with Italy in regard to the Adriatic. By their example they might induce Serbia and Rumania to act generously towards Bulgaria. In the end, Hungary would lead a great federal state, which would count in the bargaining of Europe, because it would be able to throw real weight in the scale. Then we might have some hope of a European settlement of frontiers which would be stable.”

Behind this essential truth lies a geographical analysis. Across the Middle Danube basin there stretches, at right angles to the general trend of the river, the great belt of the eastern Alps and the western Carpathians, broken only by the gorge where Vienna stands, with its back against the forested Alps and its face to the first instalment of the Danube lowland in the Marchfeld. Here to this day runs the language

line between German and Magyar ; here, too, the horsemen of the open grasslands were brought up against the forested heights ; and by their repulse Vienna became the saviour of Europe and the natural limit of the Empire. North and west of this was the Land of the Cross, while south and east of it was the Land of the Crescent : the one is still typically European, in its manufacturing industries, its material civilisation, its general adhesion to the Roman Church ; the other is typically non-European, in its specialisation in the raising of raw materials, its inter-continental interests, its general adhesion to the Greek Church.

Now the geographical nucleus here is unquestionably the natural unit of the Hungarian lowland, with its girdle of forested mountains. Round this a variety of areas, profoundly heterogeneous in relief and racial elements, shows a corresponding variety of climate and occupation, and therefore of economic and political interests, complicated by the bitter antagonism between a Christianity based on Roman Law and a Chris-

tianity based on Greek Philosophy. The finest type here—physically and racially, politically and economically—is the Magyar, usually neither Roman nor Greek, but Protestant, and dominant by his central position as well as by character and type. It always must seem intensely significant, however, that the title of the Empire ignores the mass of the population, who are devoted to their Greek Church, and only recognises the Austrians, who are in the mass adherents of Rome, and the Hungarians, who are specifically Protestants.

The latter are just as much the finest type in this region north of the Danube as the Bulgarians are south of it; and the world cannot afford to ignore or handicap its finest types. Both are of Asiatic origin, but both have assimilated all that is best in their western environment. In Hungary, the large proportion of steppe, the small proportion of forest, the lack of stone, even the seasonal changes of climate, have helped to make the Magyar nobleman less self-sufficient, less exclusive, and less aggressive than the Austrian nobleman; and the same conditions and

their influence on the nobles have helped to make the Magyar peasant more self-reliant, more loyal, more sympathetic than the Austrian peasant. For at least a whole generation the adoption of Prussian ideas and methods has shown the nation in a sinister light to other European eyes ; but no one who knows the people, has a moment's doubt about the superficial and official character of the evil.

The prime and fundamental difficulty is to weigh justly the relations of this Magyar group on the central Alföld, made dominant alike by position and by character, with its European and with its non-European foregrounds. Practically the most that can be said against Mr. Mackinder's ideal is that Hungary is economically the exact complement to Austria, and that the geographic unity of the Middle Danube basin may justify this politico-economic unit. At present Germans and Magyars together do not total 44 per cent. of the population of the Empire ; but, excluding the elements outside the Danube basin, they total over 50 per cent.

Ignoring, then, the internal relations—

whether changed or not—of the two kingdoms on the Middle Danube, we may examine the probable frontier of the particular political unit—whether kingdom or empire—on the side away from Europe.

RUMANIA

First, as to Rumania, which has certain 'claims' on both Bessarabia and Transylvania. And here Mr. Mackinder might have treated Russia on at least as high a plane as he treated Hungary. The approximate number of Rumans in Transylvania is only 1,400,000, while there are also over 800,000 Magyars and over 200,000 Saxons. The Rumanian Government reckons the Rumans in Bessarabia to be 75 per cent. of the population, and Dr. Seton-Watson estimates them in 1915 at about 1,350,000.

Here, then, the question of nationality involves two areas of nearly the same size, but of very different geographical conditions; and in Bessarabia the Rumans are distinctly localised and almost segregated, while the area of localisation suits the 'lowland'

genius of the people, and has an admirable feature available as an eastward frontier—the river Dniester. Further, Bessarabia is geographically and essentially part of, or an extension of, the Moldavian region; and the distribution of Rumans in the province facilitates the transfer from Russia to Rumania. For the chief value of the province to Russia lies in its command of the Lower Danube; but the Ruman population is practically confined to *west* of the railway line from Bender to Galatz. Again, Russia must have direct access to any new Ruthenian subjects in Galicia; but even now her main line of rail north-westward from Odessa keeps to the *east* of the Dniester, and the Ruman population in the north is practically confined to south of the railway from Mohilev to Czernowitz.

The frontier would, therefore, run from the confluence of the Pruth with the Danube along the general line of Trajan's Wall to the head of the Dniester liman (estuary); thence it would follow the Dniester to Chotin, and there drop due south to the nearest point on the Pruth; after a short

course up the Pruth, it would work across—west of Herta—by the line of minimum population to the Upper Suczawa.

Such an arrangement would still leave Russia with an aggregate gain of perhaps 40,000 square miles from Austria alone. And it would leave Rumania no excuse for not restoring to Bulgaria the Silistrian quadri-lateral—recently annexed by Rumania under the least honourable circumstances. One may freely admit that the dour and stolid individualist of the Bulgarian plateau is not attractive, any more than his language is ; but he is of sterling type—patient, persevering, enduring, democratic. And, as the latter, he has been relatively just and tolerant. It was a crime that the Jews and Turks of the Bulgarian Dobruja, after years of relative toleration, should be flung back into the social degradation and political slavery of the Jews and Turks—and now the Bulgars—of the Rumanian Dobruja.

What of the Transylvanian Rumans ? Here the geographic conditions and the distribution of people make the question exceedingly complicated. The theory that

Transylvania is hardly less isolated from the Alföld than from Rumania, has no basis at all in the physical geography. On the contrary, the only formidable highland between the two is the Bihar, which does not extend for a quarter of the Transylvanian frontier, and which only in its highest peak reaches 6000 feet; and except for the narrow Aluta basin in the extreme south-east, the whole area drains—northward, westward, and southward—into the Alföld. This triple development of the drainage in the Szamos, the Körös, and the Maros, makes it impossible to suggest any satisfactory geographical frontier; and if Transylvania is to be Ruman, the present provincial frontier should be accepted as the international frontier.

But this would transfer over 1,000,000 non-Rumans to Rumania, and would still leave in Hungary 1,400,000 Rumans, for the total number of Rumans in Transylvania and in other parts of Hungary is the same. Again, only in Hungary is there any large number of Rumans who do not belong to the Greek Church, and Hungary is one of

the very few 'Balkan' areas in which there has been really religious toleration. These considerations, enforced by the impossibility of drawing a satisfactory geographical frontier, suggest that Hungary should retain her present Carpathian frontier, especially in view of the loss of territory elsewhere.

Obviously, if Hungary is reduced in size, still more if she is isolated as a kingdom, she must abjure all imitations of Prussian tyranny, and conciliate her non-Magyar elements. The latter would then come to realise how essential linguistic uniformity is to the proper organisation of the area politically, and how a diversity of local tongues only condemns each locality to the use of a medium of intercourse which is perfectly useless in the great economic world, and which foredooms it to be the ready victim of the Germano-Hebrew middleman. In any case, if Europe can insist on territorial changes, Europe can also guarantee all reasonable rights to nationalities; and the extraordinary way in which both Germans and Jews have been absorbed by the Magyars, suggests that the dominant race here at

all events has some natural power of assimilating.

Moreover, without the slightest wish to discount the crass brutality of the typical Prussian methods, one may point out that the geographical distributions have been very favourable to plausible and even excusable exaggeration of the actual evil. For, on the one hand, the Magyars have had historically more or less exclusive occupation of the central and most fertile part of the kingdom; and, on the other hand, the minor nationalities have been usually concentrated so distinctly in compact and relatively large groups as to become peculiarly conscious of their own racial personality and to be able to express their racial resentment—like their racial costumes and emblems—with peculiar emphasis. Where there has not been such segregation in ethnic groups, with their own customs, costumes, emblems, and speech,—as in the Banat,—there ‘the evils of Magyar rule’ are most conspicuously absent.

CROATIA-SLAVONIA

But Hungary is doomed to lose territory—in some of these areas where the racial distributions are not complex, but compact, and where the geographical conditions offer favourable opportunities for a readjustment that should guarantee international peace. For throughout almost the whole of its navigable course the Drave is a very marked racial frontier; and it is most probable that Hungary must be prepared to lose Slavonia, though the creed of Croatia may be sufficient cause for her being retained within the Hungarian frontier.

The whole Save basin, with its Adriatic and Morava flanks, is occupied by a compact body of Slavs; but the relief is exceedingly intricate and often very difficult, and the racial and linguistic unity is more than neutralised by a diversity of creed. This is so bitter that the strict Orthodox will not use costume or calligraphy or typography similar to those used by their Latinski brethren. In fact, the fundamental fact which clamours for first recognition here, is

the overwhelming importance of the *odium theologicum*—which has been the curse of the Balkan peninsula. In the heat of war other influences may seem to be of more importance, but in time of peace this will assert its vital predominance ; to our frontier-drawers creed must here take precedence of race.

The two essential facts in the physical geography are that the general slope of the area is away from the Adriatic—the water-parting being in some places within five miles of the sea—and that, for this reason, the finely articulated coast of Dalmatia has very difficult access inland. In the applied geography the two vital factors are that nationality must be recognised politically, and that economically no unit must be unreasonably debarred from a sea outlet, even if it be actually a difficult and costly matter to provide the precise medium of transport. Purely historic associations, *e.g.* of Dalmatia with Venice, must be ignored unless based on racial and economic associations, especially where fundamental conditions have been upset, as in the disappearance of the Turk. This has removed

the cause which made the Southern Slavs regard the Hapsburgs as saviours, and which made the Bosniaks Muhammedans.

At once we see the importance of that natural gravitation of the core of Croatia towards the Adriatic which favoured the influence of the Roman Church. Indeed, the Croat's devotion to Rome was the one sure plank in the policy by which Count Khuen-Hedervary reduced both the Croatians and the Slavonians to impotence—an impotence which persisted down to 1906. And the existence of this typical *odium theologicum*, which is not touched by the formal *Concordat* with the Vatican, forbids the hope of making any Pan-Slav unit here for generations—until unity of economic and cultural interest becomes the dominant influence in the area.

Moreover, it must be remembered that the modern Croatia-Slavonia does not correspond with the medieval Croatia-Slavonia; that Croatia was for ages divided from Slavonia by the famous Military Frontier; that they speak distinct dialects; that the Croat tribe originally belonged

to the Northern, not to the Southern, Slavs ; and that the people to-day consider themselves much superior to the Slavonians. The discontinuity of Croatian history I have outlined elsewhere : “a period of Italian or Byzantine influence, two centuries as a Croat kingdom, five centuries under the direct control of Hungary, two more centuries under the Turks, a century under the Austrians, a few years of French rule, and then—after some vicissitudes and a National Revival—under Hungary again.”

But the separation of Croatia from the rest of the unit is suggested by other considerations, especially by the position of Hungary. The Magyars cannot be cut off from the sea, even though they have themselves—under the influence of Prussian ideas—tried to cut off the Serbs from the sea ; still less can a Prussianised Austria be given the opportunity for successful economic intrigue with such an independent Slav unit as her immediate neighbour, against another neighbour, Hungary ; and, as a matter of fact, not only are the great economic interests of all Trans-Leithan peoples more or less

identical in their relations to Cis-Leithan industrialism, but also the Magyars down to 1912 had—as we have said—at least an unstained reputation for wide religious tolerance.

The Croatian saddle, with its economic access to the sea and its adherence to Rome, should remain Magyar,—as Slavonia should remain Austrian,—especially as the intermediate belt on the Bosnian frontier is one of very sparse population with very mixed creed—Greek, Roman, Protestant, and Muhammedan. The frontier might remain practically as it is, though it might be put eastward to the line of the Unna in the north, and kept westward close up to the Kapella and Veletri scarps in the south. The Bosnian part of a Greater Serbia has already railway access to Dalmatian ports, such as Sebenico, Spalato, and Ragusa ; the Gulf of Cattaro would become Montenegrin ; and Serbia's Berchtold-nursed interest in Ægean ports would have lost its essential righteousness, while Greater Serbia would include every particle of Old Serbia, and would give Rumania economic access to the Adriatic.

ALBANIA

Then, as to Albania. Here the most significant fact is that the people seem incapable of being assimilated. Romans and Byzantines, Serbs and Bulgars, Venetians and Sicilian kings of the house of Anjou, all tried to assimilate the Albanians, and all alike found them indigestible.

Albania proper is the land of the Shkypetars, 'Sons of the Rock Eagle,' or simply 'Rock-dwellers.' Here we have the most ancient existing race in Europe, speaking a language older than Classical Greek, steeped no doubt in ignorance and superstition and blood-feuds, but probably second to none in the world for fidelity to their word and to their own ideals. Bismarck's sneer that there was "no Albanian nationality" showed crass ignorance, or was a characteristic misstatement. These Shkypetars are the indigenous and autochthonous owners of the land, which they had ruled for a thousand years before the Slav had ever crossed the Danube, and which they protected from Goth and Hun and Avar. The Bulgar was a still more

modern intruder than the Slav, not there till the eighth century ; and the modern Greek has the slenderest connection with the old Greek.

But the Shkypetars of to-day *are* the old Thraco-Illyrian strain, of the same tall and fair type as conquered the Persians and built the Parthenon ; and they have been friendly with the Turks only because the Turk too hated what he considered the plausible and dramatic Serb ; because the Turk left them practically independent ; because the Turk—if not “the only gentleman in the peninsula”—had certainly, like his soft and musical language, the most attractive personality. The fact that the Northern Shkypetars or Ghegs, ‘the Giants,’ were Moslems, did not make them Turks, though it gave them the much-desired right to carry arms ; the fact that the Southern Shkypetars or Tosks were Orthodox, did not make them Greeks, although their destiny is undoubtedly bound up with that of Greece as a rival of Slavdom. By every claim of original ownership, of a vivid nationality, of survival against Slav and Bulgar and Turk

and Greek, and of incapacity for being assimilated, this ancient nation has a claim to a frontier which shall as far as possible compromise between ethnic and strategic considerations. The introduction of the word 'strategic' here is justified, I believe, because, and only because, and only so far as, the standard of civilisation in the area forces us here to take in part the older view of a frontier, especially as the physical geography does not allow us to take fully the newer view.

The obvious meeting-place in the north-west is the Scutari lake ; and from here the line should run westward to the nearest point of the coast, thus restoring Antivari to the Shkypetars, and eastward along the most direct line of mountain crest to Shlieb. This would leave to Serbia the only piece of the whole western highland in which the feature-lines run east-and-west ; this would enable the Serbs to build a line direct—*via* the Ibar valley—from Mitrovitsa to the Adriatic. Such a line would be of great value in opening up, and so bringing civilising influences into, the least

known and apparently most backward area in the whole peninsula ; and its influence on the Albanians should be wholly beneficial.

From Shlieb the line should follow the Drin-Ibar water-parting to Shar Dagħ, restoring Ipek, Jakova, and Prisrend to their old owners and their rightful ethnic relation ; then it should follow the Drin-Vardar water-parting on to the crest of the Drin watershed east of Lake Okhrida, and so along the crest of the Pindus system to Mount Zigos, and thence along the south-east crest of the Voyussa and Kalamas watersheds to the Corfu strait, thus restoring Yanina to its builders and proper owners.

The latter part of the frontier would thus coincide approximately with that laid down by the Powers for the independent Albania ; and the inclusion of already Hellenised Epirot Albanians in the unit may further the union of Albania and Greece. Towards this desirable end the large percentage of Epirot Albanians in south-eastern Greece—actually a large majority of the total population between Athens and Corinth—will also contribute ; but the influence of the Powers

may for a time have to be exerted on behalf of these Epirot Albanians in order to guarantee, if possible, that they may have full opportunity for raising the rest of Albania to their own level, or at least not be thrown back themselves to the level of the rest.

This is a matter of vital importance, for the inclusion of Erbri—as the Albanians call it—in Albania is prompted far more by consideration of international relations throughout the whole region than by consideration for the immediate future of the Epirots. The past relations of Italy and Austria in the Adriatic must colour the future relations of Italy and Greece, while Montenegro and Serbia are also interested in the ultimate evolution of Albania; and it is beyond question that for some two thousand years the Adriatic has been practically an Italian lake, shut in by the narrow (50 miles) Straits of Otranto.

It is not surprising to find that the essential seeds of trouble were sown by Austria. For many years now the Austrians have regarded the eastern coast of the Adriatic as their own special reversion from

the dying Turkey ; and, in the furtherance of that end, they inaugurated a wide and thorough propagandism in Northern Albania, the Mussulman beys and the Roman Catholic priests (over whom Austria claimed an exclusive protection) lending themselves characteristically to the political intrigue.

But the Albanian coast, like the Dalmatian, has never had an intimate association with its own hinterland ; it has always been—practically, if not politically—under the ægis of the western coast. Italy, therefore, was more or less forced to adopt a somewhat similar system of national propagandism in Southern Albania ; and, as the natural frontier between Epirus and Albania is the Voyussa valley, the Italian propaganda spread into Epirus to cover the flank of the Otranto Straits. And it would seem that at present Italy is justified in holding Valona.

But the Epirot Albanians in civilisation and in sentiment are utterly and essentially Greek. In this connection the wearing of the fustanella is conclusive ; it means that the wearer, even if he speaks Albanian—or possibly even Rumanian—considers

himself a Greek. Not only so, but—in proportion to their numbers—these Epirot Albanians have done more than the Athenians themselves to beautify and enrich Athens. That these people should be left to form the heart and intellect of an independent—perhaps only temporarily independent—Albania must minimise causes of international friction in the Straits. And, as Albania develops under their guidance, or at least under the spur of their influence, their presence as Christians in the extreme south-west may be as useful as that of Malissai and Miriditi in the extreme north-east. The ideal consummation would be that the whole area, with its new standard of civilisation, should decide its own destiny in conjunction with congenial neighbours. Already Serbian dialects are as common in the north as Greek is in the south; but in the meantime Italian interests are just as slight at Cattaro, with its essentially Slav environment, as they are vital at Valona, with its purely Albanian environment.¹

¹ The neighbouring population is of very pure Albanian type and very friendly to Italy.

MACEDONIA

Macedonia, as we insist on calling the linked vilayets of the Monastir highland and the Salonika lowland, is, perhaps, the greatest crux of all, partly because it has epitomised Balkan problems, and partly because its racial base is essentially Bulgarian.

Historically, it has been quite typical of this dual area that it has been the worst-governed portion of the whole peninsula. Of course, there has been no Macedonian race or Macedonian speech or Macedonian creed, though both human type and speech are more or less transitional between Bulgarian and Serbian, with the elements balanced in the proposition of 2 (Bulgar) to 1 (Serb). There has not been, however, any single race or speech or creed that was obviously dominant in the area; but Turkish rulers and Greek merchants and Bulgarian farmers have been bilingual or trilingual, and changed their speech—if not also their creed—with their politics. Greek, Bulgarian, Serb, and even Ruman Churches

were all busy making converts and building schools, as a basis for claiming a share in the area when it eventually came to be divided; and individuals of all races tended to ally themselves nominally with the Greek Church, as politically the strongest. The confusion was made worse by the series of political spheres of foreign influence—British, French, Russian, Austrian, and Italian.

The fact that the racial base is Bulgarian has become of special importance since the Treaty of Bukarest, when Rumania mulcted Bulgaria of her Dobruja—with its purely Bulgar and Bulgarophil population, and when Serbia and Greece divided between themselves the essentially Bulgarian part of Macedonia—with the total result that, as estimated in *The Journal of Race Development* (Jan. 1915), well over a million of admittedly Bulgarian people are now under foreign rule in the peninsula, of whom 600,000 are in Serbia, while the rest are about equally divided between Greece and Rumania. Nor must the official conduct of Bulgaria under a Coburg prince be allowed to blind us to the admirable qualities of the

Bulgarian people themselves, or to the fact that they have no kindred people outside the area, and so can expand *only inside* it.

Two facts are specially important in this connection. The one is that a markedly Bulgarian type forms the essential mass of the population of Macedonia longitudinally right up to the Albanian frontier; the other is that latitudinally along most of the coast there is a dominant Greek type, penetrating some distance inland in Thrace. The former is associated with a continental climate and heavy agricultural work, such as Greeks are incapable of maintaining, and the latter with a Mediterranean climate and light horticultural work. In the former case the men are occupied in grain-growing and stock-raising, with their women in dairy-work; in the latter case the men are occupied in commerce—and mainly in maritime commerce, with the women engaged in horticulture. The Bulgar is just as incompetent to develop the seacoast as the Greek is to develop the hinterland; and Economic Geography would distribute them accordingly.

Two geographical facts are also important. The one is that the natural route from Sofia to the Ægean is by the Struma valley; the other is that, even as at present delimited, Bulgaria controls all railway traffic on Constantinople.

In view of the probable relations of Greece to Albania, it would be an advantage for the Monastir vilayet to be Greek; and the subjection of its Bulgar people to Greece would stand against that of the Greek people in Thrace to the Bulgars. In view of the value, to the whole area, of the Greek mercantile element along the coast, with its important east-and-west traffic, it is desirable that a considerable portion of the coastland should be Greek; nor must this mercantile element be cut off from the Vardar-valley railway—which, except on the ‘Salonika’ lowland, runs along the *west* bank of the river. Further, as Greater Serbia would include a very large addition of territory, with access at several points to the Adriatic, Serbia would no longer have the slightest excuse for extension of territory southward—*i.e.* southward of Uskub,

where the pure Serb population suddenly stops.

The Serb frontier should, therefore, be moved northwards to the limit of the Serb population; and Greece should occupy the whole area up to that and eastwards as far as the Vardar. On the coastland the Greek frontier should extend also as far eastward as the Lower Struma, and far enough north to control the whole railway route between the Lower Vardar and the Lower Struma. Greece would thus gain—apart from any islands acquired—considerably more territory than she would lose; Serbia would have no kind of excuse for grumbling; and Bulgaria would require only the restoration of the filched Dobruja.

There would still remain the question of the territory at present Turkish. The essential need here is for both the Straits to become International waterways free from all restriction, political and otherwise; and to guarantee this it seems almost necessary that one of them should be held by an International Commission. Everything points to the European end being the one selected,

so that both the Gallipoli peninsula and what we may call the 'Trojan' peninsula would become International territory. The only 'Balkan' Power then left with an unrecognised interest in the waterway would be Rumania; and her interest would be infinitely less than that of Russia, especially if Russia had restored Bessarabia to Rumania. Moreover, Russia is the only Power in the area capable, on economic grounds, of administering the great nodal metropolis of Constantinople.

In these circumstances the obvious solution would be for the Bulgarian frontier to be advanced to the lake-and-swamp belt along the Chatalja Lines, and for Russia to obtain both the Constantinople and the Skutari peninsulas, with her Anatolian frontier running roughly north and south slightly to the east of the Alem Daghs.

Even with its obvious short-comings, this general arrangement does attempt to meet the critical situation. It creates as many independent States as possible—on the basis of ethnic completeness; it makes them as



large as possible—to guarantee them against any bully ; it assumes that the rise of national sentiment in the area is of democratic, not dynastic, origin—*i.e.* is defensive, not aggressive ; it deprecates the betrayal of these rising democracies to suit the indolent arrogance that waits to see ‘ which way the wind blows ’ ; it asserts that strategic frontiers are prepared *ex hypothesi* for war, and that non-strategic frontiers must favour peace.

Democracies are literally ‘ sick to death ’ of war, and are no longer going to allow fanatics to settle normal international differences by the sword. So why provide frontiers which tempt the panic-struck or the treacherous to ‘ get in the first blow ’ ?

CHAPTER VII

GEOGRAPHIC CONTROL

IF we were all agreed that such rearrangement was necessary, and if it were already an accomplished fact, what guarantee should we have of its permanence ?

Students of politics seem to be looking forward with something like confidence to the emergence of a Confederation of Europe. As I understand it, in such a Confederation every country except Germany would be included ; and, obviously, it would be useless, if not actually harmful, to include Germany at first, because—by the theory of what passes for statesmanship with Germans and by their practice in recent years—her pledged word, even on ‘ a scrap of paper,’ is perfectly valueless.

It is suggested that the members of the Confederation would agree to give the arrangement a fair trial for, say, five years,

and that every member would be pledged to contribute a proportional quota of armed forces towards the compulsion of—or to enforce an economic boycott against—any country which tried to upset the settlement during those years. This would at least give time for adjusting details—by common consent, and for examining the need for any changes at the end of the period.

In the eyes of geographers it would have a still greater value, for it would test the conviction that—other things being equal—the best type of owner for any given area is the type which found in that area its own “area of characterisation,” *i.e.* its own racial home. For the *genius loci* impresses itself on its whole domain—botanically, politically, linguistically, etc.

Every unit of Climatic Control has its own appropriate ‘response’—in forest or grassland or desert; and every Natural Region has its own flora and fauna, which provide what is normally the best food for Man in the particular region—from the extraordinarily rich milk of the reindeer to the least nitrogenous of tropical cereals.

It is in obedience to similar controls that the third generation of Australian-born 'Scotsmen' shows, even in New South Wales, typically Neapolitan colouring—of hair and eye and skin; and the whole problem of a "White Australia" has behind it the certainty that the descendants of Europeans who may have settled in the Northern Territory, will survive only by developing a protective adaptation to the climatic environment, and in front of it the question of whether persons with such adaptations as, *e.g.*, concave noses and very dark skins will be accepted as "White."

Even human speech responds to such controls, *e.g.*, in the United States, where the distinctive 'American' intonation varies with the distance from the coast except in the case of quite new comers. The original immigrants from North-West Europe, with its raw climate and high humidity, were at first incapable of producing anything except "throaty" sounds; and the descendants of those who remained on the Atlantic seaboard, show little change. But the descendants of those who migrated into

the drier climate of the continental interior, have had their thick vowels thinned out, their harsh consonants softened, and the whole process of speech "lifted up" out of the throat; and the ultimate result, as I have suggested elsewhere, will be an approximation to the clear and musical tones of the indigenous Amerind—however in-harmonious the intermediate process of "tuning up" may be in most cases.

Even our own share of responsibility for the war can be written, to some extent, in terms of Geographic Control—the 'control' exercised by an ocean margin and the 'response' shown in a wide tolerance. For islands set down in the shallow seas of a broad continental shelf are predestined to rear a race of fishermen and to be a nursery of civilisation.

The isolation of such a group of islands favours the evolution of a marked racial type; its small area favours both political unity and that inbreeding which develops a plastic type; its physical subdivisions favour individualism and initiative, and disfavour uniformity.

But behind all is the fishing 'control'—with its essentially democratic 'response' in the equality of man and woman in the jointly-owned house and of man and man in the jointly-owned boat. For while the man is absent—for hours or days or weeks—from that home which represents all his creature comforts when he escapes from the risks and restricted spaces of his boat, the woman manages everything on shore; and when he returns, tired out with his long night-watches and quite ignorant of what has been happening in his absence, he is not competent at once to take up the reins of government, nor is she prepared at once to lay them down. So, in the jointly-owned boat, the skipper was only one of four or five owners, who was chosen by the others to give reasonable orders. Common danger demanded instant obedience from all to such orders, but it was the obedience of co-operative equality, and there could be no tyranny. Outside the boat, as inside the home, there were equality and tolerance.

But islands held by a fishing race are in little danger of invasion; and so in early

days they needed a minimum number of men and a minimum amount of material for home defence, and had a maximum of both for trade and rule abroad. Thus a sea-fishery develops naturally into sea-commerce; and the fisherman loses what is bad in insularity—its parochialism and narrower prejudices—as he visits, trades with, and eventually gets dominion in, all the corners of the earth. And so wide commerce, when developed naturally out of a sea-fishery—which German commerce was *not*—must involve wide tolerance, not only between man and woman and between man and man at home, but also a tolerance of all differences of colour and creed, of custom and conduct, abroad. Of course, such a tolerance may come to appear as apathy, selfishness, even cowardice; and only insular virility prevents it from degenerating into a flabby and maudlin cosmopolitanism.

This is our own position—in both its risks and its rewards. It is difficult to illustrate the domestic position without seeming to be trying to make a political


‘point.’ But to one whose daily work is to visualise comparatively the peoples of the world in their geographic environment, it is obvious that we are tolerant beyond other nations.

It was typical that we tolerated from the Germans themselves economic and political encroachments, abuse and ridicule, veiled threats and other impertinences, until a people so reared in machine habits as to be incapable of spiritual insight came to believe firmly that we *would tolerate anything*. They were mistaken; but that is where, and why, and how far, we are innocently responsible for this war. The over-tolerance of the ocean margin was irresistibly provocative to the arrogance of the continental interior.

The point need not be elaborated, especially after the emphasis laid, in a previous chapter, on the influence of Geographic Control on the Prussian plain. But the irresistible conclusion is that the mature development of Europe—itsself proved by the essentially democratic base of the rise in national consciousness—demands that

uniformity, political or otherwise, shall *not* be imposed on the Continent. On the contrary, each coherent unit of characterisation, however small, shall have freedom of individuality and of opportunity.

This can be effected only by the ruling out of domineering ambitions and aggressive interferences, and it can only result in an enrichment of the whole life of the Continent by its fuller and freer variety of detail. That variety is itself inherent in the varied relief and climate, and its free and full expression will imply that the various organic units are corresponding with their geographic environment. In this we have the real guarantee that the settlement would be stable.



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